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The thesis is an analysis of the planning standards whibh
emerge in a selected group of Massachusetts planning cases.
The object was to see if a system of planning standards
exists, implicitly or explicitly in the law decisions.
Three general types of standards are identified, but they
do not form a consistent pattern in thecases. Those stan-
dards which do exist, relate primarily to old conceptions
of land controls. The more modern planning thinking
has failed to develop complementary standards. A balanced
relationship between the types of standards and the phases
of planning is suggested. Such an integrated system of
standards will enable the planner to present his cases with
more authority and will free the Courts from outmoded jus-
tifications for planning controls. Suggestions for further
research are included.
Thesis Supervisor: Frederick J. Adams
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I. INTRCDUCTION
It is believed that an inquiry into the meaning of planning
standards is necessary for three reasons:
a. Planning calls for the development of and allocative
process through which the community's goals can be
approached in an orderly and rational fashion.
b. The generic term "planning standards" is often
used but seldom defined, the results being
vagueness and ambiguity.
c. Planning literature offers little in the way of
systems of standards which can be analyzed, utilized
or criticized.
It is suggested that the adjudicative process may offer a body
of evidence from which one can derive a system of planning standards.
Through an analysis of a selected group of planning cases the paper
attempts to identify these standards, to assess their roles and to
indicate the gaps and inadequacies that appear.
planning and standards
A plan is a draft or form, a graphic representation or a
diagram. A plan is also a method or scheme of action, a program,
outline or schedule. City plans are both of these things --
pictures of the future and outlines for achieving them. Currently
city plans are being developed and argued over, implemented or
abandoned, by a group of people who concern themselves exclusively
with the complexities of urban problems. These men have defined
their occupation as follows:
"City planning may be regarded as a means for system-
atically anticipating and achieving adjustment in the
physical environment of the city consistent with social
and economic trends and sound principles of civic design.
It involves a continuing process of deriving, organizing
and presenting a broad and comprehensive program for
urban development and renewal. It is designed to fulfill
local objectives of social, economic and physical well-
being, considering both the immediate needs and those of
the forseeable future. It examines the economic basis
for an urban center existing in the first place; it
investigates its cultural, political, economic and
physical characteristics both as an independent entitity
and as a component of a whole cluster of urban centers
in a given region; and it attempts to design a physical
environment which brings these elements into the soundest
and most harmonious plan for the development and renewal
of the area as a whole."1
In other words it strives to be an ideal process of
continual readjustment among a hierarchy of entities and forces --
an attempt to regulate the growth and development of the neighborhood,
the community and the urban complex to their mutual as well as
independent benefits.
This paper is concerned with the role of standards in
planning, For the course of subsequent discussion we will take these
standards to be the rules by which one can measure quantity, value or
quality. As a result we will be discussing the guidelines and
constraints which the planner and the public use in their attempts
to secure a desired level of environmental conditions. We will
question the guidelines from which planning seeks to impose develop-
mental patterns, and try to determine why a planner's decision has
any special validity.
The following exchange between a prospective builder and a
local planner illustrates the interdependence between planning and
standards;
planner - "It does not seem unreasonable to say that
the zoning of a piece of property may be
recommended for change under certain
conditions necessary to protect the devel-
opment of the area. In this case one of
those conditions is that the area be ripe
for development."
builder - "And you tell me when it is ripe? By what
standards?" 2.
By what standards indeed? How have planners met such challenges
in the past? Have they developed a reasonable set of rules by
which to measure their own wishes and innovations? What sort of
convincing rebuttal can they offer to such charges?
types of standards
If standards offer some hope for better and more meaningful
planning, one must inquire further into their characteristics. The
planner will be able to manipulate them with greater sensitivity
and thus be assured of achieving desired ends once he understands
their unique qualities. One hopes that these standards can be
organized into a system which parallels the steps and levels of the
planning process. The first step must structure standards themselves.
A basic duality appears from the very definition of a
standard, Two broad and strikingly different divisions can be
identified; the "objective scale" standard and the "general consensus"
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standard. Chapin, in his definition of planning, implicitly empha-
sizes the rational and efficient approach, the !sdientific method" if
you will, of data accumulation, analysis, and objective decision. A
large number of planning studies are pre-occupied with such method-
ogy.
Some of these studies define problems and indicate alter-
natives, if not answers, in a highly satisfactory fashion. They
form a factual bulwark which provides some sound guidance for the
planner. These are the studies in which standards have been form-
ulated as reasonable out-growths of the factual data. Street design,
air pollution, noise control and sewer and water facilities all
Lend themselves to such treatment. Note that while they alL relate
directly to planning they have basic and measurable "engineering"
components. Elements of the systems can be subjected to test
situations under control conditions and performance measured on a
scale. This objective scaling in turn provides a "built-in" basis
for standards. The drawing of the cut-off Line at a given point
on the scale is determined by considerations of health and safety.
The development of these objective scale standards can then be
verified through direct measurement. Certainly the system has its
flaws. Our measurement devices may be crude and unrealistic, and
our answers may be wrong. However, it is the potential of direct
measurement that distinguishes this classification.
The second category of standards encompasses the "non-measurables".
This larger, more diffuse area includes the social goals, activities
and mores. The social scientist has not as yet been able to
construct a scale which can translate social desirability with any
degree of precision. For example, how does one measure the benefits
derived from having running hot water in every dwelling unit in a
city? One can point to trends, to statistical comparisons between
areas that have hot water and those that don't, but none of this
gives any necessarily binding cause and effect relationship. To
date objective scale standards cannot give any satisfaction in such
problems. They must be reinforced or contradicted by a set of
personal measures of desirability and "goodness" derived from back-
ground and culture and which, in aggregate, form a set of poorly
defined but operationally effective standards. This second large
category will be called "general consensus" standards.
A third area of controls impinges on the two groups of
standards defined above. These are the loose goal statements often
referred to in master plans or the master plans themselves. Clearly
tgoals" does not equal "standards" in every sense. For example, a
population and its planners can (and often does) agree on a
"1standard"for a front yard, without knowing or caring what goals
they are implementing . Or they can agree on a "goal" of a higher
level of employment, with no need to set any "standard" in order
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to provide a basis for action. However, master plans and other
goal statements are sometimes officially adopted by a municipality.
When this happens, one can argue that the goal has in fact become
a standard; a scale against which public and planner measure the
merit of proposals, Those which meet the terms of this new
"standard" would be considered "good" and therefore worthy of
implementation; those which fail would be discarded.
This brief introduction to the characteristics of standards
will be expanded as the paper proceeds. However, an early under-
standing of this three-way split will clarify subsequent case
discussions.
10.
FOOTNOTES
1 Chapin, F.S.
Urban Land Use Planning
Harper Bros., New York, 1957, p.XIV.
2 Haar, C.M.
Land Use Planning Casebook
Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1959, p.271.
3 While.considerations of the timing of development
do not emerge in the Massachusetts cases, and
while they do have some standards of their own
not treated here, the example is typical of the
challenges put to planners in many phases of
their work.
4 Chapin, F.S.
op. cit., p.XIV
5 Distinction suggested in comments by Prof. J.T.Howard
of M.I.T., 9 January 1962.
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II. THE CHOICE OF THE SAMPIE AREA
The original problem of the thesis involved a discussion
and analysis of a field of planning standards which had reached a
significant level of development both in terms of use and
expression, As noted above such a field could not be found. There
was no evidence in, for example, zoning of an articulated group of
standards having been constructed and used in any regular or
reliable fashion. Housing, park, and recreational facility
writings all offered some loose recommendations as to desirable
relationships between population and facilities, but seldom have
these been constructed according to standards, used, and then re-
examined to determine effectiveness.
It therefore became necessary to switch the paperts
emphasis to an inquiry of what standards did (do) in fact exist,
what role they fulfill and the possibility of developing a
general and overall system. The planning law cases that have
been adjudicated offered a field of evidence for such a topic. A
substantial body of such law exists, for with our comparatively
recent pre-occupation with urban life, the simultaneously changing
needs and aspirations of human beings have strained and tugged at
existing legal institutions and doctrines. The role of the planner
in this city- life- court-relationship has a strong past and the
potential for a powerful future;
"The writings of students 'of the city have had a
great impact on the form of legislative control of
land activity and city development... Moreover
they are frequently the lens through which the courts
view these activities."
Complementing this somewhat pro-planning sentiment, the planner
approaches litigation with a basic bias -- he believes his position
is right, and he wants to win, More often than not he has the
buttressing support of a legislative expression, but his position
must be explicitly stated and well documented to assure a victory.
As a result litigation proceedings often incorporate the most
carefully expressed defenses for planning innovations and concep-
tions that can be found. The opposition relentlessly picks holes
and finds flaws putting the planning proposal to the test. Plan-
ning standards should emerge here if anywhere.
All of the planning law cases in the United States pre-
sented a broad area for inspection; too broad for the scope of
this paper. Several alternative subdivisions of the area were
considered, One would have used a segment of the planning field,
such as: zoning, housing or urban renewal and examined it on a
country-wide basis. This alternative was discarded. The major
problem in discussing planning standards seems to lie in their
disjointedness and the hazy conceptions of how a given standard
should be "plugged in" to the overall planning process. Choice
of one segment as suggested above would preclude any attempt to
look at this stumbling block comprehensively. A district
division offered a more satisfactory vehicle for the discussion.
This type of area could be taken according to court hierarchy
(an analysis of those cases decided by the U. S. Supreme Court),
geographical areas (those cases reported in the sectional case-
books), or according to political boundaries.
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Ultimately it was decided to limit the paper to a
consideration of the planning law cases of Massachusetts. Several
factors determined the choice. There has been a long history of
adjudication of planning conflicts, with the first case before the
3.
court in 1899. Massachusetts early adopted zoning and has kept
pace with many other planning innovations in the subsequent years.
The state shows a relatively high degree of urbanization, with
better than half a dozen substantial centers. In addition a
decided suburban movement has put pressures on a number of small.
towns, and a shift to industrial park use has forced the conversion
of some outlying land from single family to industrial zoning.
Urban renewal, public housing and subdivision control are also
represented in the staters activities. Generally the Commonwealth
serves as a typical example of the pressures on land and planners cxncn
the conceptions and innovations that may be brought to bear on them.
Other states offer as good or better source material. New Jersey
cases represent more avant garde proposals. New York and Wisconsin
also have large bodies of significant cases, but Massachusetts had
the added advantage of available court records. Where evidence
cited was scanty or poorly developed, recourse to the records gave
a full understanding of the planning position.
the law case and planning
While the interdependency of law and planning begins to
emerge in the preceding pages, one should be aware of the closeness
of this relationship. The fundamental point of emphasis is that
the court ultimately controls implementation. No new solution, no
matter how brilliantly conceived or enthusiastically supported, will
see the light of day without judicial approval. Of course there may
W1 .
be a substantial time lapse between legislative approval of a
proposal and litigation; but the promise of a test is omnipresent.
By the same token, we must reconsider Mr. Haar's point that the
writings of planners are "frequently the lens through which the
courts view...legislative control of land activity and city
development".5. The process is something of a feedback coupled with
a "cultural lag". In the early part of this century the planning
pioneers wrote extensively about the philosophy of planning.
Happily this was more thought than verbiage. These expressions
of planning philosophy controlled Mr. Justice Sutherland in his
pivotal decision upholding zoning. This decision alone added needed
critical momentum to the planning movement. Planners then coasted
on their victory for several years, adding little of significance
to these early statements. As a result courts are still deciding
zoning cases on the principles of the 1920's. Since the writings
of planners had the influence with the judiciary that they did,
there is no reason to believe that their subsequent writings, if
equally persuasive, should be less effective. This is the feedback
mentioned above. Allowing some flexibility for the conservative
nature of the courts (a type of cultural lag) they should still be
in step with, though perhaps a few paces behind, the spokesmen for
planning philosophy.
The second tie between the law case and planning relates
to the question of evidence. In law it is something of a maxim
that evidence wins cases. A planner's evidence mainly depends on
showing that one pattern, etc. is "better" or "worse" than another.
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The relative benefit or detriment to the community controls the
court's determinations. The role of evidence then becomes almost
synonymous with the role of standards. The more convincing the
planner's case, the more closely the evidence he cites consists
of expert-endorsed standards. The following case analyses will
illustrate the effectiveness of standards. We will also see how
a lack of standards leaves the court groping in an uncomfortable
fashion and returning to old-fashioned justifications for support
in its decision.
I k
FOOTNOTES
1 Haar, C.M.
Land Use Planning Casebook
Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1959, p.3.
2 Ibid., p.42.
3 Attorney General v. Williams
174 Mass. 476 (1899).
4 Boston, Springfield, Worcester, Lowell, Lawrence,
New Bedford and Fall River are the major centers.
5 Haar,C.M.
op. cit., p.42
6 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)
It is this case that gave rise to the term
Euclidean zoning, In the majority decision
Justice Sutherland drew the analogy between
the segregation of uses and nuisances saying,
"A nuisance may be merely a right thing in a
.wrong plabe - like a pig in the parlor instead
of the barnyard." (see also text p.28)
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III. RESULTS OF CASE ANALYSES
data sources and problems
Through the use of the "Massachusetts Digest", the "Zoning
Digest", etc., it was possible to compile a comprehensive listing
of Massachusetts planning cases. The list was then revised and
condensed to a selected group of cases relating, in an implicit or
explicit fashion, to standards. All of the cases listed have been
appealed at least once and are fundamentally concerned with
planning. The process of listing them pointed out the fact that
the great majority were zoning adjudications. Housing and urban
renewal amounted to only a very small percentage. Several factors
account for this
- zoning is the oldest of the planning controls
- zoning specifically draws boundaries and determines
allowed uses
- zoning may be modified only through the use of a
variance or amendment
- zoning regulates in terms of the present, expressly
prohibiting creeping changes in use.
Zetwnq.
liaeimg has been in effect in Massachusetts since 1907.
No other planning control, having such a general control, has existed
for such a length of time o'
One of the important characteristics of this control is its
specificity. To zone is to draw boundaries and create differing
districts, and inevitably every piece of land falls within one set of
detailed restrictions or another. The land may lie on the edge of
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the district, or have other peculiarities. These alleged in-
equalities of the zone restrictions are fruitful grounds for
litigation. Variances and amendments offer the only relief.
Legally a variance can be sought when the restrictions inflict
undue or severe hardship on a single lot or parcel. The device
was developed to adjust a general system to the inevitable
eccentricities of particular pieces of land. The determination
of just what constitutes undue or severe hardship accounts for
much of zoning law.
Amendments differ as devices, adjusting the total
ordinance. They re-categorize substantial areas in response to
major changes in use pressures. The size of the parcel affected
by the amendment plays an important part in the determination of
its justness. If the area is too small, the amendment can be
struck down as spot-zoning.
The use of each of these devices can be challenged by a
"properly aggrieved party" and brought before the courts for
review. In zoning this means that every landowner has the po-
tential right to test a given zoning restriction and the number
of opportunities soar. Housing and urban renewal differ from
zoning in that they affect only a limited portion of the city.
Once the legality of the procedure is established, the chances
for further litigation are Limited. This imbalance in the data
must be taken as a "fait accompli". However, the standards
encountered in each category do not seem to differ radically as
to type or quality. This apparent consistency means that sub-
sequent discussion will make "inter" as well as "intra" category
comparisons with equal freedom.
Another imbalance creates more of a problem. The amount
of evidence cited in a given decision varies markedly from justice
to justice. A thorough perusal of the court records, with their
complete accounts of evidence, would of course iron out these ir-
regularities. However, time limitations dictated that this give
way to a careful sifting of the reported decisions, supplemented
only in isolated instances by the record. With this problem faced
another emerges. In some cases a judge takes pains to recite ex-
tensively from the evidence of the earlier hearing; at other times
he gives it only cursory notice. It would be tempting to hold
that the judicial reaction serves as a measure of the quality of
the evidence presented. Unfortunately this does not hold true.
While expert testimony plays a compelling role, the sparseness of
its appearances prevents one from drawing any general conclusions.
Of course not all "planning cases" are decided on planning
grounds. The judge may look for statute violations, constitutional
violations, etc. before turning to a consideration of the actual
planning question. A case in point sought to enjoin the granting
of a variance for the construction of a "Howard Johnson-type"
restaurant. The presiding judge held that the Circle Lounge and Grille
Inc. was not a properly aggrieved person and therefore could not
bring action.2 No other party pursued the question, and the
restaurant does a thriving business today. The court commented on
zoning to the extent of noting that, "The residence zone was de-
signed to protect residence from business...It was not designed to
protect business from business". The interesting planning questions
of traffic generation in an already highly congested area and the
aesthetic effect of the structure on park land were never considered.
20.
There are a number of similar cases, where a potentially significant
issue is side-stepped by the court. One should not infer that the
court is side-stepping its duty as well as the issue; the example
serves only to point out the type of role the court would like to
follow, both through preference and tradition.
general characteristics of standards
We turn now to the cases that do make planning decisions.
In the preceding discussion we have taken some pains to point out
the relationship between evidence and standards and the part of
each in judicial decision-making.
The basic "standard" controlling the courts is the aggre-
gation of legislative expressions that has built up over the years.
The courts have always recognized and fostered the right of the
legislature to restrict the actions of one for the protection of
the whole. Planning controls are but a small facet of the total
body of law dedicated to this end. Time after time the courts
reiterate the fundamental right of the people to exercise this
power. In these terms they upheld zoning, subdivision controls,
etc. as being for the protection of the "public health, safety,
morals and welfare". Where a proposed building violated the rear
and side yard requirements of the zoning code, the court ordered
the building permit revoked. The Zoning Act stated in part that:
"In interpreting and applying the provisions of this
act, they shall be held to be the minimum require-
ments for the protection of the health, safety,
convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the
Citq of Boston.' 4
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The court's decision merely affirmed the right of the legislature
to enact such a statute. By recognizing the right to determine
minimums in zoning, they apparently withdraw from examining the
intricacies of arriving at a standard. If the line or boundary
falls within reasonable limits, they are content to give the
"benefit of the doubt" to the legislature. 5 .
This presumption in favor of the statute also affects
its enforcement. In zoning one of the major areas of contention
is the granting or denial of a variance. In a surprisingly flat-
footed statement the court dealt with the question of granting
variances from the zoning code in Pendergast v. Board of Appeals
Barnstable. The court explicitly held that, "a judge can seldom,
if ever, grant a variance which has been refused by a board of
appeals". The plaintiff in the case sought a variance for a
beach house or bath house for commercial purposes in an area
zoned for residence. The decision minced no words in stating
that no one has a right to a variance. Variances, they felt,
should be used sparingly and need not be granted even if a
peculiar hardship is shown to exist.
The courts are equally stringent in their interpretation
of spot-zoning. In planning cases this term is something of a
legal swear word. The spectre of spot-zoning can send even the
most brazen amendment-chaser scuttling for cover. In 1941 the
New Bedford Planning Board labelled a zone change spot zoning
and detrimental to the best interests of the public.' The City
22.
Council failed to take heed and passed the amendment. On appeal
the court looked back to the spot-zoning charge, concurred with
it and struck down the amendment. Again in Salem, an attempt to
create a "funeral home district" received an equally cool
reception. *The trial judge found that the new district would not
"promote public health, safety, morals or welfare", would not
result in a "uniformity of regulations and restrictions for zones,
districts or streets having substantially the same character", and
was " unreasonable and capricious beyond the power conferred"; a
clear case of spot zoning. *
The basic justification of slum clearance, urban renewal
and public housing also seems tied to legislative expression. The
initial findings at the administrative and legislative levels that
such activities were in the best interest of the public, weighed
the balance in the judicial review. Seldom does the court question
the "rightness" of these findings.
Complementing this broad area of legislative expression,
one finds a small area of planning theory. This is most fully
developed in zoning. Three early cases outline these basic con-
cepts as seen in Massachusetts. The first case testing a planning
210.
regulation of any importance was adjudicated in 1899. It concerned
the erection of a building in Copley Square in Boston and its
relationship to a statute setting structural height limitations.
The statute prescribed that no building be erected to a height of
more than ninety feet. Allowances were made for domes, spires and
23.
sculptured ornaments to project above this height, subject to the
approval of the Board of Park Commissioners. Designs for the
building in question called for a top floor ceiling height slightly
more than ninety feet above the ground. However, the architects
planned a band-like frieze around the tope of the building, the
bottom of which would start well below the height limit.
The court held that the frieze did not meet the terms of
the ordinance or the allowed exceptions and then went back and
examined the reasonableness of the restriction itself. Their
decision affirmed the restriction without qualification, citing
the following points:
- they determined that Copley Square was an open
square, basically a park, which had been carved
out for the use, benefit and health of the public.
- the statute was in effect taking the air rights
adjacent to the park, and it seemed to be "in the
nature of an easement created by the statute and
annexed to the park".
But then the question arose as to the right of the legislature to
take these adjacent easements. Did a public purpose exist in fact?
The court's resolution is of interest in the light of later decisions.
"The grounds on which public parks are desired are
various...they are expected to minister, not only
to the grosser senses, but also to the love of the
beautiful in nature...their influence should be
24.
uplifting and in the highest sense educational...
their aesthetic effect never has been thought un-
worthy by those best qualified to appreciate it.
It hardly would be contended that the same
reasons which justify the taking of land for a
public park, do not also justify the expenditure
of money to make the park attractive.., to those
whose tastes are-being formed...if the Legislature
was seeking to prevent unreasonable encroachment
upon the light and air which (the park) had pre-
viously received, we cannot say.that the law-
making power might not determine that this was a
matter of such public interest as to call for an
expenditure of public money and to justify the
taking of private property."
But, the decision points out that the findings would have differed
if the legislative intent had been "to preserve the architectural
symmetry of Copley Square" or "merely for the benefit of private
property owners".
With a height limit upheld, the next test involved actual
zoning or districting. In 1904 a simple and rather unsophisticated
ordinance was passed, dividing the City of Boston into varying
11.
height districts. The case of Welch v. Swasey challenged the
legality of such a device, on the basis of four constitutional
questions:
- can the legislature limit the height of buildings?
- can it set up districts with different heightrequirements?
25.
- can it delegate the power to determine boundaries?
- can it delegate the authority to permit different
heights in different places?
These guestions closely resemble the early challenges to zoning
ordinances in other states. They are of major importance to
planning because they go to the root of the power of any planning
board to encourage the orderly growth of different uses in differ-
ent parts of the municipality.
The court held once again that the legislature, through
the exercise of the police power, may regulate and limit personal
rights and property rights in the interest of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare. In addition, "with considerable
strictness of definition the general welfare may be a ground,
with others, for interference with the rights of property..."
Thus even if the general welfare be the main reason for the sta-
tute, it is also necessary to tie some considerations for health,
safety and morals into the statement of statutory intent. Here
one sees the beginning of a problem, alluded to in Attorney
General v. Williams, that will plague the court in many subse-
quent decisions. How must welfare statutes be framed in terms
of health, safety and morals; and, when does the welfare clause
become sufficient by and of itself?
However, in this early case the question did not press
the court too severely. It held that the legislature can deter-
mine if the threats to public health and safety require limita-
tion or regulation for general protection. Apparently the
erection of very high buildings, especially on narrow streets,
could materially exclude the health-giving sunshine, air and
light to the detriment of the public health. Such high buildings
also constituted a threat from increased danger of fire and the
inability of apparatus to service such areas properly. These
premises seem to stem from certain standards, which can be
phrased as follows:
- sunshine, air and light have health-giving
properties, and there is a determinable
minimum amount of exposure to which everyone
is entitled.
- spacing between buildings should be g.given
distance because above such a point the dangers
from fire are significantly increased.
- streets have a minimum width for fire-fighting
equipment.
The court seems to consider these implicit in the case, for the
decision continues, stating:
"We cannot say that the prohibition of the erection
of a building of a greater height than 80 feet (in
class B), unless its width on each and every public
street on which it stands shall be at least one
half its height, was entirely for aesthetic reasons.
We conceive that the safety of adjoining buildings,
in view of the risk of the falling of walls after a
27.
fire, may have entered into the purpose of the
commissioners..."1.
The "safety clause" is clear and upholds the constitutionality of
height limitations. This leaves the question of varied districts
unanswered. If excessive height poses such dangers, shouldn't all
areas of the city be equally protected?
The answer is stated with an economic bias:
"The value of land and the demand for space in those
parts of Boston where the greater part of the
buildings is used for purposes of business or com-
merce, is such as to call for buildings of greater
height than are needed in those parts of the city
where the greater part of the buildings is used
for residential purposes."
Therefore it seemed reasonable to the court that business buildings
be allowed to be higher than the residential buildings even though
the streets be narrower. One standard of minimum safety could be
applied to business and commerce, while considerations for family
safety dictated stricter regulations in residential areas.
A similar philosophy emerges in the case of Slack v.
13.
Wellesley. A by-law requiring a side yard was apparently adopted
"to aid in the prevention of fires and not as a set-back line".
The court seemed to be justifying itself into a cul-de-sac. -There
would come a time, when the overworked rationals of fire danger,
health and safety would crack under the increasing needs of the
28.
communities. This collapse was inevitable but slow in coming.
Zoning spread rapidly over the cities and towns of Massachusetts:
a strict and rather strait-laced zoning. What Charles Haar calls
"Euclidean zoning...a system of use control through the demarcation
of rigid districts, each with its own set of uses", was first upheld
in the case of Euclid v. Ambler. Sutherland, writing the majority
decision, said:
"The matter of zoning has received much attention
at the hands of commissions and experts, and the
results of their investigations have been set
forth in comprehensive reports...which bear every
evidence of painstaking consideration. (They)
concur in the view that the segregation of resi-
dential, business and industrial buildings will
make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable
for the character and intensity of the development
in each section; that it will increase the safety
and security of home life; greatly tend to reduce
street accidents...by reducing the traffic and
resultant confusion in residential sections; de-
crease noise and other conditions which produce
or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more
favorable environment in which to rear children, etc.
These same sentiments echo through the case of Brett v.
B4.Building Commissioner of Brookline. Brett was enjoined from
29.
building a two-family house in a single family zone and challenged
the validity of such a restriction. The court faced the problem
of justifying the statute or striking it down. Deciding to support
the provision they cited the by now familiar threat of fire. They
held that an increase in the number of families produced a corres-
ponding increase in the number of stoves and lights, obviously
increasing the fire hazard. The decision noted that spacing be-
tween buildings, which lessened the chances of conflagration, had
previously been upheld. It was deemed reasonable "that the health
and general physical and mental welfare of society would be pro-
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moted by each family dwelling in a house by itself". The direct
health benefits include the increase in fresh air, in play areas
for children and in places for adults to move about. The family
has the opportunity to cultivate the land, and the spread of con-
tagious diseases is less likely. Thus single family housing
operates for the general benefit of the public.
But, some die-hard might argue, doesn't such an ordinance
lead to undemocratic and unconstitutional segregation of housing
choice? This challenge of economic segregation was lightly
treated by the court which noted:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that there are
in numerous districts, plans for real estate
development involving modest single family dwell-
ings within reach as to price of the thrifty and
economical of moderate wage-earning capacity."
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Besides the whole town did not fall into this single family cate-
gory. There was still considerable choice of alternative types of
housing. A second look at the case proves that it is little more
than a reiteration of the philosophy found in Welch v. Swasey.l*
The same biases exist; the same standards control the decision.
Earlier we referred to the fact that the courts were
stumbling down a blind alley in their preoccupation with "the
danger of fire". But perhaps they saw the trap too. In the case
of Nectow v. Cambridge we see the first glimmer of the court's
awareness that standards could be a problem.19"
"If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line
must be drawn somewhere. There cannot be a twi-
light zone. If residence districts are to exist,
they must be bounded. In the nature of things,
the locating of the precise limits of the several
districts demands the exercise of judgement and
sagacity. There can be no standard susceptible
of mathematical exactness in its application.
Opinions of the wise and good may well differ as
to the place to put the separations between dif-
ferent districts...Courts cannot set aside the
decisions of public officers in such a matter, un-
less compelled to the conclusion that it has no
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or
irrational exercise of power having no substantial
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relation to the public health, the public morals, the
public safety or the public welfare in its proper
sense. These considerations cannot be weighted with
exactness. That they demand the placing of the
boundary of a zone 1001 one way or another in land
having similar features would be hard to say as a
matter of law...the case at bar is close to the line.
But we do not feel justified in holding that the
zoning line established is whimsical and without
foundation in reason."
This case was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court which re-
viewed the low court's findings with some care!O'It paid special
attention to the master's findings and the city plan. It felt that
it was in fundamental agreement with the lower court; and, if the
boundary of the zone had been the only issue, it would not have felt
justified in replacing the planner's authority with its own judge-
ment. But the boundary was not the only issue. The Supreme Court
further held that the power of government to regulate the usual
rights of the landowner, by regulating allowable uses through zoning,
must bear substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or
general welfare. Unless such relationships exist, zoning is an un-
reasonable invasion of property rights. As the master's findings
indicated that this relationship was lacking, the Court felt that
"...the invasion of the property of the plaintiff..(as) serious and
highly injurious is 'clearly established; and, since a necessary
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basis for the support of the invasion is wanting, the action Of
the zoning authorities...cannot be sustained".
There is an interesting contrast between the decision of
the two courts. On its face the case lacks any real planning
strength. The master's findings emphasize the dubious advantage
that the city gains from the ordinance. The Supreme Court stresses
that the zoning board should be able to relate its determinations
to some sense of the public benefit. While the state court takes
Pains to give weight to the local findings, and points out that
standards of mathematical exactness will remain elusive, it fails
to consider that the persuasiveness of these very points can be
reversed. For example, if the standards used in the boundary
determination were not of a definable or quantitative nature,
then the observation (of the high court) that the boundary might
be just as effective if shifted one hundred feet, is reasonable.
The evidence implies that there were no standards involved, that
the. line was drawn without any thoughtful consideration. This
in essence is the conclusion of the Supreme Court. However, the
latter also indicates that a thoughtful and reasonable decision
must be directly related to health, safety, morals and general
welfare.
By 1953 the philosophy set forth in Nectow v. Cambridge
had been modified to the point where the Massachusetts Court
could blandly state, "there is nothing to show that peculiar
significance should be attached to the division of the premises".21 .
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This was the decision in a case where the zone boundary ran through
a given building. Two-thirds of the building fell within the busi-
ness zone, while one-third was in an apartment district. The
building.could be used for business, but it's freight platforms
were no longer serviceable as they lay within the residential zone!
The lack of evidence in the case as to any unreasonable hardship
which might ensue makes it somewhat special. While it cannot be
tagged as a "trend-setter", it does offer an interesting contrast.
problems of "Euclidean standards"
While the court adheres to the principles of Euclidean
zoning ("the demarcation of rigid districts, each with its own set
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of uses"), planners are gradually moving away from this conception
of land control. In planning terms Euclidean zoning was typified
by an ordinance spelling out numerous rules and regulations and a
large map with colors illustrating various use districts. The
pressures of variances and amendments made planners turn a forth-
right gaze on the zoning problem and cast about for ways of ex-
panding the basic Euclidean concepts into a more sensitive system
of controls. Henry Fagin has been the most eloquent spokesman for
this need.
"The evolving demands on urban planning have forced a
shift in focus from the MAP to a program of action.
The ultimate master plan as the goal of planning is
being replaced by a "planning process" conception,
in which the master plan is regarded as an open-ended
sequence of plans, describing at each successive
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point in time, a desirable equilibrium among ever-
changing activities...Necessarily this conception
of planning involves a coordination in time as well
as space, of programs as well as land areas...static
space coordination is not merely inferior, it is
impossible in a dynamic world."23.
Even while the planner optimistically probes these frontiers,
court decisions time and time again rest on black and white Euclidean
determinations. The courts do not bear the whole burden for this
situation. While the planners talk in "Fagin" terms, they have
not translated any of their thinking into operationally useful
guides. Those standards that do exist are usually-stated as follows:
- the maintenance of a satisfactory level of public
services for all while preserving municipal solvency.
- the maintenance and respect of the essential frame-
work of our institutions.
- a solution to a given problem which produces a
rational pattern for the productive life of the
region, taking cognizance of natural needs and inter-
dependencies.
- the assumption by each town of its fair share of the
regional growth problems and not the mere shifting of
responsibility to another.
- the equalization of fiscal resources without a com-
plete seperation of tax raising and tax spending
functions.
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- the solutions to financing local government services
having roots in political reality.24.
Standards such as these are reasonable, rational and leave few
grounds for dispute. They are standards with a future-looking,
almost utopian ring. But they seem considerably closer to state-
ments of goals than they do means for insuring day-to-day high
quality of environmental conditions. And, as far as the courts
are concerned, there is little hope that such general statements
can offer them A guidance in the average litigation.
Aid to the court must come from a different corner. The
numerous rules and regulations; the map boundaries and the state-
ments of legislative intent which mouth the sentiment of the pro-
tection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare all re-
quire reviewand rethought. Problems arise when one tries to
develop standards from these propositions and finds that they
have no interrelationships among themselves. For example; a
judge can apply the yardstick of "public safety" to a problem.
Necessarily his own conception of the public safety governs his
thinking, because no one has ever spelled out the definition(s)
of the term. When faced with the danger of fire, the judge con-
cludes that the closeness of buildings bears a relationship to
the likelihood of conflagration. He then maintains that in-
creasing the number of families in a dwelling increases the
danger. But are these increases proportional to one another?
Does a house with two families pose twice the threat; one with
three families three times the threat, and so on? Or how about
the contrast between an apartment house of modern fireproof con-
struction and a single family carelessly maintained frame dwell-
ing with primitive appliances? These questions remain unanswered
in the courts, as indeed they should, but they are central to the
planner.
On the other hand, there is some merit in these "goal-
tending" standards. One Boston case held that zoning must stand
to accomplish the aims of the legislature which it identified as:
- stabilizing the use of property in different
sections of the community.
- protecting property owners in various diatricts.
- preventing the invasion of business into resi-
dential sections .25
The plaintiff in this case wished to construct a clothing store at
the edge of an apartment house district. The court denied the
issuance of a variance. In arriving at its decision the court
followed several interesting steps. First, it examined the
legislative intent in the zoning statute and was able to trans-
late this into the above specific goals. These goals in turn were
converted into decision-making guides (in a "mind's eye" sort of
process). This gave the court some rule of thumb standards on
which to base its decision. The case offers an interesting sug-
gestion. Perhaps sensitive goal formulation on a number of levels
will give us a flexible yet serviceable set of guides. This will
be more fully considered below.
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By now it should be clear to the reader that the word
"standards" is loose and poorly defined in planning. This is
mainly due to the fact that there is a hierarchy involved, in
terms of standards, and in terms of what they control. The
planning process may be divided into objectives, procedures and
techniques; or the aim, the way and the how. A correlated type
of standard impinges on each of these three categories. The
process statra with the formulation of a goal or set of goals.
When these are developed, they must then be translated into
something enforceable -- hence the appearance of a standard.
Charles Haar raises the question of the position of the master
plan in such a scheme. He seems to be arguing that when a
master plan (a community goal) is officially adopted, it be-
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comes a kind of gross standard. Fagin of course flies the
danger flag at just this point claiming that, when the planner
draws the master plan with some precision on a map, the map
becomes the standard; and the whole thing becomes an awkward
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and inflexible mass. The hope, rather, is to encourage the
development of standards at the technique and procedural
levels. This would mean that the ;goal had been translated
into something enforceable at a level where such enforecment
becomes administratively practical. Some of these standards
will be quantifiable, others will not. The result is the
dichotomy of objective scale and general consensus standards
outlined earlier in the paper. Note, however, that dichotomy
is not a "bad" word. Even two types of standards can work
together in a smooth and complementary relationship.
Changes due to time, social and economic factors
While the concepts of the 1920's dominate the preceding
cases, there has been some more up-to-date activity in a few
planning areas. Three particular areas of change can be identified;
patterns of use, housing and slum clearance, and the role of the
comprehensive plan. The changes are not revolutionary, but they are
profound. They may be futile stabs at sawdust dummies, or they may
indicate a thoughtful trend to meet ever-growing challenges. The
identification of these three areas does not mean that other states,
etc. have not met the problems in other, perhaps more meaningful,
ways. However, these are the only areas which emerge in Massachu-
setts.
The recent decades have produced two significant changes
in urban patterns. On the one hand the bedroom suberbs have pro-
liferated at astonishing rates. On the other, changes in industrial
technology have produced the phenomenon of the industrial park. Both
have put severe strains on the "outer belts" of our urban cores. The
land sucked up in this maelstrom of development had previously been
lightly used. Characteristically agriculture-oriented communities
predominated, with small industries and occasional country estates
mixed in. The sparse land controls affecting these areas encouraged
continued low density development. With rapidly rising land pres-
sures community reaction crystallized at two poles. Some towns em-
barked on a flat-footed policy of "preserving their rural character"
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while others zoned extravagant areas for industrial development.
In 1941 the Boston suburb of Needham amended the town
zoning ordinance to require that the minimum house lot size be
fixed at one acre.2 The plaintiff wished to develop a subdivision
of half-acre lots and challenged the validity fo such an amend-
ment. The town was essentially residential with little manu-
facturing or commerce activity. At the time of litigation
there was a healthy demand for houses. In light of this demand
the plaintiff argued that the amendment substantially diminished
the value of his land and that he was being unfairly deprived of
his rights. Both the plaintiff and the town agreed that the
physical characteristics of the district in question and of the
town as a whole, rendered it very suitable for single family
construction. The town held that the statutory desires of the
zoning by-laws to,
"...avoid congestion in the streets, to secure
from fire and other dangers, to prevent over-
crowding of the land, to obtain adequate light,
air and sunshine and to enable (the land) to be
furnished with transportation, water, light,
sewer and other public necessities, which when
established would...harmonize with the natural
characteristics of the locality, could be ma-
terially facilitated by a regulation that pre-
scribed a reasonable minimum area for house lots."
While this evidence supports the value of single family
lot patterns, ten thousand square foot lots would seem to satisfy
the zoning intent too. No so held the court, for the town showed
reasonable qualitative differences:
- greater freedom from noise and traffic.
- reduction of danger from fire (sometimes the
court seems pyrophobic).
- greater and better opportunity for rest and
relaxation.
- better play facilities for children within
their own yards.
- an increased inducement for gardening.21*
Such standards are as far-fetched as any we have yet encountered.
They are almost laughable until one considers the substantial sum
of money that the plaintiff lost as a result of the decision. Was
the court really capricious in its decision? In fairness, no.
The court strengthened its position by adding that where the
question is one which reasonable men might debate, the weight in
the finding'lies in the town's expressions of its own needs and
desires. This deference to the "voice of the people" is actually
30the standard.
But the planners have forsaken the courts in a rather
serious fashion in these cases. Every time the court is forced
to cite such inadequate evidence, the planner's position suffers
a little more damage. If they do not leap into the breach with
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some sort of evidence, they will find that the courts have fenced
them out. Simon v. Needham upheld a control that means much to
the planner. Acre zoning in itself may be of limited importance,
but it is another variation in the theme of land control. If
planners wish to have continuing judicial support, they must
start to make their position more convincing.
An interesting sidelight appears in conjunction with
the preceding case. In land the emphasis has always been on the
regulation of minimum lot sizes. With buildings the usual con-
cern has been with maximum height. However, one Massachusetts
case was concerned with the minimum height of buildings. The
cases for maximum height and minimum lot tie in closely with
public health... etc. considerations. A minimum height restric-
tion does not enjoy that connection. Indeed it plunged headlong
into opposition with traditional concepts. The Brockton City
Council sought to impose the minimum on its CBD, by amending the
zoning ordinance. The amendment would serve to;
- encourage the most appropriate use of the land
- facilitate adequate provision of transportation
- increase the amenities of the municipality
- conserve the value of the buildings
- prevent the character of the CBD from changing
due to the dispersal of the occupants of the
upper stories through the construction of one
story buildings.
- maintain the revenues of a hard-pressed city
- preserve the aesthetic sense of the city; a
one-story building in the presence of three
and four stories would create a "carnival town"
atmosphere and "destroy the symmetry" of the
city.
The court replied to this evidence holding that the scope
of the zoning power could not encompass rulings for a general appear-
ance ideal, or for the inflation of taxable revenue. The amendment
overrode the purposes set forth in the original zoning statement
(lessen congestion, prevent overcrowding of land, avoiding undue
concentration of people). The intent of the amendment directly
opposed the intent of the statute. The ideals of spreading people
out and of alleviating crowding and congestion, which permeated the
Euclidean concepts, came face to face with the somewhat avant garde
concepts of "visual image", aesthetic effect and city structuring.
No matter, the court stated that:
"where legislation seeks to force land to remain
vacant unless the owner will erect a structure of
at least two stories...the general benefit to the
public must be something more tangible and less
nebulous than any supposed advantages that the
city has been able to bring forward in this case."
An interesting point is raised in the court's request for
tangible evidence of public advantage. The decision does not claim
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that the city has gone beyond its power. It merely asks for con-
vincing justification for the proposal. The planner has not as
yet come to-grips with the problem of standards for aesthetic
provisions in zoning by-laws. But perhaps such standards are
incompatible with the zoning by-laws as currently stated, and
must wait for a general revision of the statutes. 32.
The most startling planning innovations in recent years
involve urban renewal and public housing. Not only do they startle,
they embody many fundamental changes in the attitudes towards the
government's role and powers in the control of land development.
The planning position has met with consistent approval from the
courts even though many of the cases tested rather radical
proposals.
The dominant change in the philosophy concerns the inter-
pretation of the concept of public use. Early land takings for
parks, streets and schools were easily justifiable as being in the
public interest because the general public had free access to them,
Anyone can sit in a park or walk down a street. But when public
housing was suggested, a furor ensued. How could the government
take land from one group of individuals in order to build housing
restricted to a different group? The answer lay in the type of
land to be cleared. All of the early housing projects premised
their reasonableness on the fact that they removed slums. The
definitions put forth in "An Act to Relate the Massachusetts
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Housing Law to the United States Housing Act of 1937", illustrate
this basic emphasis.
Low Rent Housing: decent, safe and sanitary dwellings
within the financial reach of families with low income and
developed and.administered to promote serviceability, efficiency,
economy, and stability.
Families of Low Income: families who are in the lowest
income group and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private
enterprise in their locality...to build an adequate supply of
decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for. their use.
Substandard Area: any area wherein dwellings predom-
inate which by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding faulty arrange-
ment or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities,
or any combination of these factors are detrimental to the public
health, safety, or morals.
Project: the removal of buildings from a substandard
area, or in providing decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income, or in a combination of the two.
The Act further declares that substandard dwellings exist in some
areas and that there is an inadequate supply of low rent housing near
employment areas. The situation, it states, cannot be met by the
ordinary workings of private enterprise. Further a project may be
undertaken only on the condition that the "...project includes the
elimination of by demolition, condemnation or effective closing of
unsafe or unsanitary buildings situated in the same city or town,
"containing dwelling units substantially equal in number to the
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number of newly constructed dwelling units provided by the
project".
In the first Massachusetts test, the problem then di-
vided into two questions, one concerning the legitimacy of slum
clearance, the other the legitimacy of providing housing. The
legislature noted that slums did exist and tended to increase crime
and menace the health and comfort of the inhabitants. The court
then developed the analogy between a slum and a public nuisance,
deciding that the elimination in either case would be of direct
public benefit and advantage to all people. Such elimination lay
beyond the powers of private individuals and was, therefore, a
bona fide area for public action.
As for the provision of low rent housing, the court
held that it was only accessory to the main aim of slum clearance.
Because the Act required an equal number of units, the housing was
secondary. Government entered into housing only to prevent undue
hardship to those whose residences were razed and for the preven-
tion of future slums. The subtle change from public use to public
benefit becomes clear. No longer is physical use of the facility
by the general public the determining quality. Slums are consid-
ered to inflict harm on the public body. Like a rotting tooth,
the removal takes away a drain on the whole system. The replace-
ment with a false tooth only facilitates chewing.
After the approval of the propriety of housing, a new
extension of power developed. This was embodied in the urban re-
newal program. Now well established, the policy of allowing
government to sieze land and resell it for private development
received skeptical comment from many property owners. In 1954
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the case of Papadinis v. Somerville tested the propriety of the
action.3 The case involved a slum-clearance project. The plain-
tiff questioned whether'the project could be classified as a
public use or service. The area proved to be substandard and
decadent, and the city approved a redevelopment plan. It in-
volved taking land by eminent domain, clearing the buildings and
subsequently reselling the parcel to private parties for private
industrial use. If the city had been attempting to take the land
of one individual in order to turn it over to another, there would
have been a clear violation of personal rights. Then slum clear-
ance would have been subordinate to the real purpose of the actions.
However, the court felt that the primary municipal purpose was the
clearance of menacing slums. The subsequent sale became incidental
and perfectly proper, because the city had no obligation to hold
cleared and unproductive land.
A companion case followed which tested the proposal from
a different angle. ,'Again the plaintiff sought to enjoin the taking
of his property through eminent domain. His case hinged on the fact
that the area had a thickly settled residential complexion. The
city's plan called for the assembling of the land into large parcels,
clearing it of buildings, relocating the streets and selling it back
to private persons for light industrial use only. No residence was
allowed. Again the city submitted, "many detailed subsidiary find-
ings plainly sufficient to support the general findings" that the
area was substandard and decadent. The court reaffirmed the typical
slum quality of the project. Further it specifically declined to
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take over an administrative function and question the findings,
even though the plaintiff argued that the project was activated
by illegal motives; i. e.
"...the desire to change the area from one pre-
dominantly residential to one exclusively
industrial in order to increase taxable real
estate and personal property valuations and
to compete with other municipalities in the
attraction of new industrial enterprises."
The court refuted the charge on the grounds that it had no evi-
dence to show that the city was acting in bad faith. While they
recognized that there were certain financial advantages to the
city, these did not indicate that the dominant purpose was other
than elimination of slums and the diversion of the land to its
"highest and best use".
These cases put Massachusetts squarely into the public
benefit camp. The conscious expansion of the public use theory
gave planning yet another tool for reshaping land patterns. But
once again, no development of standards complemented the advance.
It may be difficult to forecast the lengths to which the courts
will go in their interpretation of the public benefit. It may be
too far or not far enough for the planner. A sensitive dad
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of _ could do much to control the situation.
The third area of change stems from the emergence of
of the master, or comprehensive, plan as an instrument of power
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in litigations. In every case reviewed, where a proposal was in
accordance with a comprehensive plan, it received court support.
The plan offers a forceful medium for the introduction of new
planning conceptions. Take for example the case of a town on
Rte. 128, the recently developed circumferential route around
Boston. Woburn rezoned an area adjacent to this belt for indus-
trial use.'The court held that
"...the council could reasonably conclude that
rezoning the areas...for manufacturing and
business purposes would attract to Woburn
desirable business and manufacturing estab-
lishments which otherwise would not locate
there, and this would make it practicable for
the city to install sewerage facilities which
would also benefit the neighboring residential
areas..."
Economic factors also cropped up, for with its leather trade gone,
Woburn needed new industry. This would increase property values,
while providing employment and decreasing taxes. More modern
thinking emerged as the court noted that areas with the same
character were being zoned for the same use and that the rezoning
followed a comprehensive plan. There was some additional evidence
that the area had ripened to the point where an alternative devel-
opment should be considered. The court failed to cite findings as
to the suitability of the land to industry, the effect of the
increased accessibility to markets, labor force or distribution
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centers, or any other unique qualifications of Woburn for such
use. In the absence of contradictory evidence it is fair to
argue that the court assumed that such investigations had been
carried out in the formulation of the master plan. Such an
assumption of planning thoroughness should be reasonable. Then
the court's face value acceptance of the plan as a compelling
standard becomes very important as a persuasive tool. It gives
both the planner and the court a flexible yet effective basis
for decision making.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF GROSS PATTERN
While the case research may not prove exhaustive, it
was extensive. Yet only one hard and fast conclusion emerges;
that is the failure to discern any organized standards con-
sistently involved in the decision making activity of the court.
Perhaps one cannot expect a system, but rather should look for
an implicit pattern. But no positive pattern emerges either.
Rather one sees a series of gaps and holes, a negative pattern
if you will, where the absence of standards compels attention.
While this tells little about the complexion of standards, it
does indicate the types and areas of standards needed.
general description of the existing pattern
Earlier in the paper, three categories of standards
were developed. The first, the objective scale standard was
defined as "that which is set up and established by authority
as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, value, extent or
quality". The second, "that is established by authority, cus-
2.tom or general consent as a model or example; test, criterion".
The third is the goal-oriented standard which has been stressed
above. None of these categories have any proper effectiveness
when applied singly. Indeed unilateral use can render them
functionally meaningless. In concert however, they suggest a
balanced program for rational activity. Prof. J. K. Galbraith
,speaks to this point in his graphic description of Los Angeles:
"The city of Los Angeles in modern times is a
near classic study in the problem of social
balance. Magnificently efficient factories
and'oil refineries, a lavish supply of auto-
mobiles, a vast consumption of handsomely
packaged products, coupled with the absence
of a municipal trash collection service,
which forces the use of home incinerators,
made the air nearly unbreathable for an
appreciable part of each year. Air pollu-
tion could be controlled only by a complex
and highly developed set of public services --
by better knowledge stemming from more re-
search, better policing, a municipal trash
collection service and the possible assertion
of the priority of clean air over the produc-
tion of goods. These were long in coming.
The agony of a city without usable]air was
the result."3.
The "assertion of the priority of clean air" stood as
a goal for the people of the city. But "clean air" is not en-
forceable. Who do the police apprehend? What do the newspapers
sieze upon? The goal must be translated into a program of stan-
dards. When home incinerators are prohibited, a violator can be
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dealt with; when factories can release only a limited amount of
cinder into the air, periodic checks are possible to determine
compliance. Standards can give the goal some muscle.
The formulation of the goal however must precede the
development of the standard. Otherwise the standard risks be-
coming a vicious threat to growth, progress and creativity.
For when a standard does not have its beginnings in a goal, it
can take the place of a goal, distorting the function. The
only result is the ruthless imposition of a mundane status quo.
As Toynbee and Ghiselen warned, society would be infected with
standardization and unthinking routinization. 4-
On the other hand a goal without a standard does not
pose such distressing alternatives. Though far from perfect,
such a goal may become a loose and general guide for activity.
The master plan sometimes has these characteristics. The pro-
tection of the "public health, safety, morals and welfare" also
operates in the "goal-standard" fashion. The statement crops
up continually in the preceding cases, usually embodied in the
"legislative intent" clause, where such and such a provision is
deemed necessary for such protection. Administrative findings
are made, the legislature adopts them in the public interest,
and the court sustains them as the public's desires. The pat-
tern typifies many of the preceding cases. A related "goal-
standard" appears in the gradual shift of emphasis from a
dependence on the public use theory to a new reliance on the
concept of public benefit. Above we asked when the "public
welfare" clause would become a reasonable basis for legislation
in its own right, ending its false dependence on the health and
safety phases. This finally happened in the public housing cases
which sanctioned governmental action for the public benefit. The
concept of general public use or service gave way; and, as the
goal of government underwent a metamorphosis, the standard exper-
ienced a similar and simultaneous change.
All of these "goal-standards" are closely related to
general consensus standards. Just as a goal does not lend itself
to explicit quantitative formulation, its related standard can be
correspondingly general. Only when one leaves the level of com-
munity objectives and goes back to the areas of technique and
procedure do explicit and quantifiable standards become possible.
Conceptually the easiest to understand, this area is technically
underveloped. Quantifiable standards scarcely appear in the
cases. In part this ig due to the court's reluctance to question
the administrative findings in a particular case.' For example,
the evidence that labels a residential area a slum never comes
before the court, unless the plaintiff charges that the findings
have been carried out in "bad faith". As fOr the rest stan-
dards simply do not exist.
The procedural standards have both quantitative and
general consensus components. Procedure is taken to be the
manner or method of a course of action, and there iw a level of
public interest which requires that regulations and restrictions
be applied with fairness and equality. Usually these feelings
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are expressed in terms of laws or principles which are commonly
accepted without particular argument. Occasionally as in urban
renewal, they arouse protest, and generally these procedural,
standards show the poorest degree of development. V. B. Stanberry
decries the lack of thought and consideration spared to this field.'
Planning preoccupation seems to lie in technique, with some scant
attention given to goals. Planning principles (or procedural
standards) sit forgotten on the shelf. Stanberry points out that
the sum of well-planned parts does not equal a well-planned whole.
A platitude at first glance; a sensitive indictment of planning at
the second. The preceding case evidence does not help to solve the
situation.
Techniques, the third planning area for standards, lend
themselves most readily to the objective scale type of guidance.
These come closest to 'expression in the comfortable tenets of
Euclidean zoning, the provision for safety from fire, and light and
air requirements. Unfortunately none of these standards were cited
in specific language in the Massachusetts cases. Some evidence came
close1 however, like the tests of side-yard requirements which fixed
a given number of feet from the lot line as a minimum. Never stray-
ing from a ten to twenty foot range, the regulation appeared reason-
able and received court approval.71
discussion of desirable pattern
The sketchy characteristics of the existing standards out-
lined above must somehow be structured into a reasonable pattern.
No attempt shall be made to suggest a sophisticated form of inter-
relationships. Rather the following is a rough conception of gen-
eral outlines of relationships which can be refined and revised at
a future date. It serves only to organize categories and to give
some form to the complexities one glosses over in blithe references
to planning standards.
The preceding discussion can be expressed as a simple
diagram:
PLAN STANDARD
Objective Goal oriented
Procedure General consensus
Technique Objective scale
Or alternatively the two lists could be used as cross
headings for boxes, with a given standard assigned to the proper
box. A standard of 300 children per elementary school could then
be expressed as a general consensus -- procedural standard, etc.
Not all "boxes" would have an equal number of standards. For
example, conceivably very few objective scale standards would be
formulated under the plan-objective category.
The structuring is vastly over-simplified and does not
indicate any sensitive way to develop standards or to manipulate
them. It does, however, help to sort out the confusing melee of
standards and to order them with some simple connection to the
planning process. Within each category a whole crop of standards
can be developed with varying degrees of preciseness. It may be
that one area of standards will gradually encroach on another.
Perhaps measurement sensitivity can be developed to a point at
which objective scale standards will predominate. The important
feature is the preservation of the interrelationship of the var-
ious systems of standards. As long as the proper level of stan-
dards impinges on the proper aspect of planning the system can
car .p.0.
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reach almost any degree of complexity, and the framework still
be comprehended with ease. Those who develop standards (a vast
and difficult process not touched upon in this paper) would be
able to work within the categories, or among them with a feeling
of "place" in the total scale. It is but a modest beginning.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A heading such as this makes an author aware of the
limited nature of his own investigations. The ramifications of
even a simple inquiry are many. To adequately cover a topic, a
startling number of subjects must be woven together. Such com-
prehensiveness is beyond the scope of this paper, but the follow-
ing suggestions indicate the type of discussion that would be
relevant.
comparison across states
The discussion dealt entirely with the Massachusetts
planning cases. However, many other states; New Jersey, New York,
Wisconsin and California especially, have a significant body of
planning law too. In many instances there are more experimental
planning controls that have been tested, and circumstances cast-
ing different lights on problems similar to those of the sample
state. If would be of interest to see if the same sort of pattern
(or non-pattern) that emerged in Massachusetts was repeated in
these states. Likewise an interstate comparison might show up
consistencies and inconsistencies in any given state pattern.
One could also assess the reasonableness of developing broadly
applicable standards. Perhaps guides of this sort must be unique
for a given locale.
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relation to existing area of standards
Another area worthy of. investigation is a comparison
between the role of standards in the ajudication of planning cases
and their role in other fields of court action; such as, labor law.
The labor field has a significant number of standards that are used
extensively. Do they differ in kind, or role, or degree from those
that appear in planning? How were they developed? And does their
coming-of-age history suggest any short cuts for bring planning
standards to the same level?
Other comparisons are possible between the few planning
standards that emerged in the cases and other, better developed,
planning standards. These too are few in number, but the American
Public Health Association has presented some for neighborhood plan-
ning, recreational facilities, and the testing of housing for sub-
standardness. Building codes, housing codes, and health codes are
also widely accepted standards. It would be of worth to suggest a
way in which such information could be presented to the courts to
aid in adjudication.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the final analysis we are striving towards order and
beauty in life. The hope is that this can pervade our urban envi-
ronment, lifting the major segment of our society to a life of
greater fulfillment and joy. Saarinen, in describing this funda-'
mental principle of organic order, identified the key watchwords
as: expression, correlation, flexibility and protection. Expres-
ion involves the communication of a time and a people, The truer
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the expression "the more it posses those qualities that could
further the growth of that cultural tree of its epoch". Corre-
lation is like a beautiful landscape, "All these myriads of
molecular particles...are brought into a single picture of rhyth-
mic order". Flexibility and protection form the bulwarks of the
system; flexibility continually allowing it to accommodate to or
compensate for internal and external pressures and protection
acting as the overlord. Standards have the potential for such a
role by attempting to organize the existing confusion; perhaps
they can plug a large gap in the planning process.
In summary, the planning cases offer an interesting
commentary on the current state of standards. The surprising
lack of expert-testimony best characterizes the total problem.
The planners (in the cases.reviewed) have failed to support the
court with a consistent body of reasonable facts and figures.
We assumed at the beginning of the paper that standards were the
rules by which one could measure quantity, value or quality. No
pattern of such rules exists. Yet in every case where an expert
testified, the court was sympathetic.* One might do well to
question the apparent reluctance of the planner to use the evi-
dence he does have in litigations. Inadequacies not withstanding,
planners have enough information to make some sort of planning
decision. Surely this evidence could give the court some sense of
the problems which should be considered in reaching a legal deci-
sion. One of the ways to develop a system is to use its fragments
6q.
in situations where they will be analysed and criticized. Then
a reassessment of the pieces can lead to a comprehensive system.
The role for standards has been suggested above. We
find that their special roles may include clarifying the intent
when a statute is drawn. The formulation of the legislation
can be more precise if there is a supporting body of standards
related to it. Likewise standards may help the courts define the
limits of the public benefit in urban renewal programs. While
many disciplines relate to such problems, planning too, has a
large stake which should not be glossed over. And the estab-
lishment of enforceable minimums in housing, zoning and sub-
division is clearly dependent on reliable standards. In each of
these examples standards hold a unique position; they define the
guidelines from which planners work and give planning decisions
a special validity.
This paper has made no attempt to assess the "goodness"
or value of existing standards, or to develop specific standards,
or to discuss the planning guides that have been developed. Its
aim was more limited. If it has pointed to the problems faced by
a court in adjudicating a planning decision, if it has indicated
a dearth of planning standards in such cases, if it has reminded
the planner of the potential support available through the court,.
and if it has clarified the meaning of the word "standards" in
planning, then it has met its objectives.
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APPENDIX
A Selected list of Massachusetts Planning Cases
Attorney General v. Williams
174 Mass. 476 (1899)
to restrain the erection of a building in Copley Sq.
to a height of more than ninety feet
Welch v. Swasey
193 Mass. 364 (1907)
upheld districting with different heights, led to
approval of later zoning
Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline
250 Mass. 73 (1924)
upheld zoning for single family use only
Wood v. Building Commissioner of Boston
256 Mass. 238 (1926)
upheld regulations requiring side and rear yards
Nectow v. City of Cambridge
260 Mass. 441 (1927)
zoning boundary declared reasonable, later reversed
in 277 U.S. 183, 48 Sup.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842
(1928)
Prusik v. Board of_ Appeals of Bldg. De. of Boston
262 Mass. 451 (1928)
denied variance for business use
Slack v. Inspector of Buildings of' Wellesley
262 Mass. 404 (1928)
upheld side yard regulations
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Town of Lexington v. Bean
272 Mass. 547 (1930)
auto repair work prohibited in a single family
zone; upheld
Coleman v. Board of Appeals of Bldg. Dept. of Boston
281 Mass. 112 (1932)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship, variance
denied
Locatelli v. City of Medford
287 Mass. 561 (1934)
no compensation when zoning annulls building
permit
Phillips v. Board of Appeals of Bldg. Dept. of Springfield
286 Mass. 469 (1934)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship, variance
denied
LaMontagne v. Kenney
288 Mass. 363 (1934)
non-conforming use can be altered only when new
use will be less detrimental and will not
enlarge the facility
Town of Lexington v. Govenar
295 Mass. 31 (1936)
upheld prohibition of professional sign through
zoning
Wilbur v. of Newton
302 Mass. 38 (1938)
zoning of gravel pit area for residence reasonable
in light of growth pressures
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Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority
304 Mass. 289 (1939)
develops analogy between slum and public nuisance;
held that public money could be used for con-
struction of low-rent housing
Leahy v. Inspector off Buildings of New Bedford
308 Mass. 128 (1941)
zoning amendment overruled as spot zoning
Simon v. Town of Needham
311 Mass. 560 (1942)
upheld one acre minimum lot size
Smith v. Board of Appeals of Salem
313 Mass. 623 (1943)
zoning amendment overruled as spot zoning
City of_ Pittsfield v. Oleksak
313 Mass. 553 (1943)
limited lumbering allowed in single family area
even though zoning prohibits intended or de-
signed for industry, manufacturing or com-
merce in the district.
Town of Marblehead v. Rosenthal
316 Mass. 124 (1944)
zoning upheld, not spot zoning as charged
Town off Burlington v. Dunn
318 Mass. 216 (1945)
stripping of topsoil not allowed in single family
zone
Smith v. Board of Appeals of Fall River
319 Mass. 341 (1946)
permits for the conversion of single family units
in a single family zone to multiple family
units declared invalid
Building Commissioner of Medford v. The C & H Co.
319 Mass. 273 (1946)
upheld zoning ordinance prohibiting the dumoing of
rubbish etc. without the approval of the
Board of Aldermen
Olson v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Attl'eboro
324 Mass. 57 (1949)
upheld denial of garage permit due to violation of
side yard requirements
Everpure Ice Manfta, Oo. Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Lawrence
324 Mass. 433 (1949)
upheld denial of variance for new and different
business addition to a non-conforming use
122 Main St. CorD. v. Brockton
323 Mass. 646 (1949)
declared zoning ordinance which fixed minimum
building heights invalid
Barney & Carey Co. v. Town of Milton
324 Mass. 440 (1949)
undue hardship found to exist, variance upheld
Lamarre v. Commissioner of Public Works of Fall River
324 Mass. 542 (1949)
Housing authority granted variance to construct
apartments on land zoned for single family use
Tanzilli v. Casassa
324 Mass. 113 (1949)
variance granted for the extension of a public
rental garage
Circle Lounge and Grille Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Boston
324 Mass. 427 (1949)
Lounge not properly aggrieved person, but charges
relating to aesthetics and traffic are of
interest
Caires v. Building Commissioner of Hingham
323 Mass. 589 (1949)
rezoning amendment upheld
Town of Brookline v. Co R Realty Co. Inc.
326 Mass. 206 (1950)
problem of land partly in Boston and partly in
Brookline, cannot use Brookline land for Boston
rear and side yard needs
Howland v. Inspector of Buildings Cambridge
328 Mass. 55 (1951)
variance denied., no undue hardship
Co Ray Realty Inc* v. Board of Zoning Adjustment Boston
328 Mass. 103 (1951)
zoning amendment upheld
Attorney General v. Town of Dover
327 Mass. 587 (1951)
zoning amendment prohibiting all but non-sectarian,
non-profit schools in residence area held invalid
Gaunt v. Board of Appeals of Methuen
327 Mass. 380 (1951)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship, variance
denied
Shannon v. Building; Inspector of Woburn
328 Mass. 633 (1952)
rezoning for industry upheld; in accordance with
the City's comprehensive plan
Kaplan v. City of' Boston
330 Mass. 381 (1953)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship,
denied
Bicknell Realty v. Boston Board of Appeals
variance
330 Mass. 676 (1953)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship, variance
denied
City of Everett v. Capitol Motor Transp. Co. Inc.
330 Mass. 417 (1953)
zoning upheld even though boundary runs through
the building
Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Somerville
330 Mass. 107 (1953)
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Papadinis . gity of Somerville
331 Mass. 627 (1954)
slum area may be taken, cleared and subsequently
resold to a private d.eveloper
Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable
331 Mass. 555 (1954)
no one has a right to a variance and the instru-
ment should be used sparingly
Morgan v. Banas
331 Mass. 694 (1954)
rezoning amendment upheld
Raimando v. Board of Appeals of Bedford
331 Mass. 228 (1954)
denial of permit to remove sand and gravel in
single family district upheld.
Despatcher's Caffe Ing. v. Somerville Housing Authority
124 N.E. 2d 528 (1955)
Court refuses to usurp Board's role in reviewinS
slum findings; will examine them ,only under
charges of bad faith
Celato v. Board of Appeals of Boston
332 Mass. 178 (1955)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship, variance
denied
Town of Lexington v. Simeone
334 Mass. 127 (1956)
stripping of land prohibited by zoning, ordinance
upheld
McHugh v. Board of Zoning Adjustment Boston
336 Mass. 682 (1958)
action of zoning board in changing boundaries held
to be in excess of authority
Paquette v. City of Fall River
338 Mass. 368 (1959)
upheld minimum housing code
Tracy v. Board of Appeals of Marblehead
339 Mass. 205 (1959)
small business areas may be a convenience or neces-
sity near large residential areas, not spot
zoning
Building Inspector ofFalmouth v. Gingrass
338 Mass. 274 (1959)
airplane cannot be stored in garage in single
family zone
Shapiro v. ity of Cambridge
340 Mass. 652 (1960)
rezoning inappropriate, really spot zoning, de-
clared invalid.
'l3.
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Bowker v City of Worcester
334 Mass. 422 (1956)
declared slum clearance to be the primary purpose
of urban renewal
Cohen v. City of Lynn
333 Mass. 699 (1956)
upheld redistricting from general residence to
restricted apartment use
Raymond v. Commissioner of Public Works of Lowell
333 Mass 410 (1956)
amendment upheld as reasonable zone change
Pierce v. Town of Wellesley
336 Mass. 517 (1957)
upheld amendment expanding the uses permitted in
a single family zone
Town of Concord v. Attorney General
336 Mass 17 (1957)
upheld town's amendment of zoning; where the ques-
tion is fairly debatable the Court will not
substitute their judgement for that of the
citizen's
Rodenstein v. Board of Appeals of Boston
337 Mass. 333 (1958)
undue hardship exists and should be relieved by
a variance.
Planning Board Springfield v. Board of Appeals Springfield
338 Mass. 160 (1958)
zoning does not inflict undue hardship, variance
denied
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